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Abstract: 
 
This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for studying the patterns of trade 
between rich and poor countries by incorporating nonhomothetic preferences into the 
standard home market effect models of trade.  It has a continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competitive sectors with iceberg trade costs.  There are two countries, 
which may differ in their per capita labor endowment and the population size.  
Preferences across sectors are such that, as per capita income goes up, the households 
shift their expenditure shares towards higher-indexed sectors.  In equilibrium, the 
Rich country, whose households achieve higher standard-of-living, runs a trade 
surplus in higher-indexed sectors through the home market effect, and hence 
becomes a net-exporter of high income elastic goods.  The framework is flexible 
enough to allow for a variety of comparative statics.  For example, a uniform 
productivity improvement causes the Rich to switch from a net exporter to a net 
importer in some middle sectors.  The Rich gains relatively more (less) from such 
changes than the Poor when the goods produced in different sectors are substitutes 
(complements).  The effects of globalization, captured by a reduction in the trade 
cost, are similar to those of uniform productivity improvements, except that it has 
additional effects of the terms of trade change when the two countries are unequal in 
size. 
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1. Introduction  
The standard models of international trade focus on the role of supply side differences 
across countries as determinants of the patterns of trade.  For this reason, they typically assume 
that the consumers have homothetic preferences, which implies that the demand for every good 
has unitary income elasticity.  This obviously makes these models ill-suited for explaining one of 
the well-known empirical regularities, i.e., rich countries tend to export products with high 
income elasticity and import those with low income elasticity, while poor countries tend to 
import products with high income elasticity and export those with low income elasticity.  This is 
one of the motivations behind the recent works on models of trade with nonhomothetic 
preferences.1 
 However, simply adding the nonhomotheticity of preferences into these models would, 
ceteris paribus, only make rich countries import high income elastic goods.  While this might be 
useful for explaining the patterns of trade in caviar, diamonds, and other goods whose locations 
of production are determined by Mother Nature, it would predict exactly the opposite of what is 
observed empirically for most manufacturing products.  For this reason, virtually all existing 
models of trade with nonhomothetic preferences postulate that the rich (poor) countries have 
comparative advantages in high (low) income elastic goods.  For example, in their Ricardian 
models of trade, Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), Matsuyama (2000), and Fieler 
(2011), the technological superiority of rich countries are greater in the sectors that produce the 
goods with higher income elasticity.  In their factor endowment models of trade, Markusen 
(1986) and Caron, Fally, and Markusen (2014), rich countries are relatively more abundant in the 
factors used relatively more intensively in producing goods with high income elasticity.  
Although empirically well-grounded, such correlations between the differences on the supply 
side and the demand side are not causally linked in these models.  Instead, they hold by 
assumption.  In other words, these models all suggest that rich countries export high income 
elastic goods despite their demand composition is more skewed towards high income elastic 
goods. 
 In this paper, we pursuit a different approach by developing a new theoretical framework 
for studying the patterns of trade between rich and poor countries under nonhomothetic 
                                                             
1 Markusen (2013) contains a survey on a range of trade questions that require nonhomothetic preferences.  
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preferences, which suggests that the rich countries export high income elastic goods because 
their demand composition is more skewed towards high income elastic goods.   Due to 
nonhomotheticity, the cross-country difference in the standard of living causes systematic cross-
country differences in the demand composition, which in turn causes the supply-side differences, 
or the patterns of comparative advantage, through the “home market effect”.  As Krugman 
(1980) argued, when production is subject to economies of scale and trade costs are positive but 
not prohibitively high, a relatively large domestic market gives an advantage to its local firms, as 
it provides the basis from which they could export to other markets.  In Krugman’s (1980) model, 
labor is the only factor of production and there are two Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically 
competitive sectors, α and β, each of which produces horizontally differentiated goods that can 
be exported with iceberg costs.  There are two countries of equal size, A and B, where A is a 
nation of α-lovers with the minority of β-lovers and B is a nation of β-lovers with the minority of 
α-lovers.  Furthermore, the two countries are mirror-images of each other in that the fraction of 
α-lovers in A is equal to the fraction of β-lovers in B.  In this setup, Krugman showed that 
proportionately more firms in A operate in α than in β under autarky, while disproportionately 
more firms in A operate in α than in β under trade.  As a result, A becomes a net exporter in α-
sector and B becomes a net exporter in β-sector.  This is because A’s domestic market for α is 
relatively large and B’s domestic market for β is relatively large.  He called this mechanism the 
home market effect.  In Krugman’s model, the cross-country differences in the demand 
composition are due to exogenous cross-country variations in tastes. 
In our framework, instead, the cross-country differences in the demand composition are 
due to the nonhomotheticity of preferences.  We also dispense with the mirror-image assumption 
of the Krugman model. 2  More specifically, there are two countries, which may differ in per 
capita labor endowment and the population size, and a continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistically competitive sectors, which produce differentiated goods that can be exported 
                                                             
2The mirror-image setup, while simplifying the demonstration of the home market effect, has some drawbacks.   
First, it greatly restricts the range of comparative static exercises that can be performed.  Second, it leaves what is 
meant by “A’s domestic market for α is relatively large” ambiguous.  Is it relative to B’s domestic market for α?  Or 
is it relative to A’s domestic market for β?  It turns out that the answer is “neither”.   What matters for the home 
market effect is that the market size for α relative to the market size for β is larger in A than in B.  This will be 
shown later in section 3.  (See also footnote 14.) 
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with iceberg costs.3  Preferences across sectors are implicitly additively separable with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES).4  This class of utility functions, proposed by Hanoch (1975) and 
recently used by Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2015) in their closed economy model of 
structural change, has some advantages.  First, it contains the standard homothetic CES as a 
special case.  Second, it allows for any number of sectors with sector-specific income elasticity 
parameters, while keeping the constant elasticity of substitution across sectors as a separate 
parameter.5  Third, income elasticity differences across sectors are independent of per capita 
income level.6   Furthermore, with their income elasticity parameters being the only 
heterogeneity, the sectors can be indexed such that their income elasticities are increasing in the 
index.  Then, a higher per capita income shifts the household’s expenditure shares towards 
higher-indexed sectors, holding prices and product varieties available in each sector fixed. 7   
Such a shift in expenditure shares causes some entries (exits) in the higher (lower)-indexed 
sectors, which reduces the effective relative prices of higher-indexed goods, thereby amplifying 
(diminishing) the shift in expenditure shares, when different sectors produce substitutes 
(complements).  In equilibrium, the demand composition of the Rich country, whose households 
achieve a higher standard-of-living, is more skewed towards higher-indexed sectors than the 
Poor country.  This translates into the Rich’s comparative advantage in higher-indexed sectors 
                                                             
3As in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980), a continuum of sectors facilitates the characterization of the 
equilibrium and comparative statics. 
4Preferences are explicitly additively separable if written as  dscfu ss )(  and implicitly additively separable if 
written as 1);(  dscuf ss . Furthermore, implicitly additively separable preferences are CES if   dscu ss  /11))((  
= 1.  We further assume that )(us is isoelastic in u (i.e., a power function of u ) so that uus  /)(log  depends on 
s but not on u , which enables us to define the sector-specific income elasticity parameters. 
5As known from the work of Houthakker (1960), Goldman and Uzawa (1964) and others, the explicitly additive 
separability of preferences would impose the restriction that the ratio of the income elasticity and the price elasticity 
is constant across all the sectors.  Deaton (1974) and Hanoch (1975) argued that there is a priori no reason for such a 
restriction to hold empirically.  Notice that one of the implications of this restriction is that homotheticity implies 
CES and vice versa.  In other words, nonhomothetic CES preferences cannot be expressed in an explicitly additively 
separable form.  But they can be expressed in an implicitly additively separable form. 
6This is in strong contract to the Stone-Geary preferences, which implies that income elasticity differences across 
sectors decline with per capita income.  Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2015) offer empirical evidence that income 
elasticity differences across sectors are roughly constant over a wide range of per capita income levels.   
7Formally, the weights attached to different sectors in preferences satisfy suus  /)(log
2   > 0, i.e., )(us is log-
supermodular in u and s. Then, with u as a shift parameter, the density function of the expenditure shares across 
sectors satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR), and its cumulative distribution function satisfies the first-order 
stochastic dominance (FSD).  See Athey (2002) and Vives(1999; Ch.2.7) for log-supermodularity and monotone 
comparative statics and Costinot (2009) for the first applications to international trade. 
©Kiminori Matsuyama, HME and Trade Between Rich & Poor 
5 
 
through the home market effect.  Although there are two-way flows of differentiated goods in 
each sector, there is a unique cutoff sector such that the Rich runs a trade surplus in the sectors 
above the cutoff and the Poor runs a trade surplus in the sectors below it.  Thus, the Rich 
becomes a net exporter of the high income elastic goods, and the Poor becomes a net exporter of 
the low income elastic goods. 
Our framework is flexible enough to allow for a variety of comparative statics.  For 
example, a uniform productivity improvement causes the cut-off sector to move up.  Thus, the 
Rich switches from a net exporter to a net importer in some middle sectors, generating something 
akin to product cycles.8  The intuition behind this result is easy to grasp. As the world becomes 
richer, the households in both countries shift their spending towards higher-indexed sectors.   
Thus, the relative weights of the higher indexed sectors, in which the Rich runs a surplus, 
become higher.  In order to keep the overall trade account between the two countries in balance, 
the Rich’s sectoral trade account must deteriorate in each sector.  This is why the Rich’s sectoral 
trade balances switch from being positive to negative in some middle sectors.  How welfare 
gains from such a change are distributed across the two countries depends on the elasticity of 
substitution across sectors; a uniform productivity improvement widens (narrows) the welfare 
gap between the Rich and the Poor when the goods produced in different sectors are substitutes 
(complements). 
The effects of globalization, captured by a trade cost reduction, are similar to uniform 
productivity improvements, except there are additional terms of trade effects when the two 
countries differ in size, measured in the total labor supply.   When the two countries are equal in 
size, the wage rates are always equalized across the countries and hence the terms of trade are 
not affected by a reduction in the trade cost.  This means that the country with higher per capita 
labor endowment always has higher per capita income and achieves higher standard-of-living.  
And without causing any terms of trade change, the effects of globalization are isomorphic to 
those of uniform productivity improvements.  A lower trade cost allows the households in both 
countries to have better access to the differentiated goods produced abroad.   In particular, 
globalization through a trade cost reduction causes the Rich (Poor) to switch from a net exporter 
                                                             
8The existing models of international product cycles, such as Krugman (1979), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and 
others, rely on some types of technology diffusion from the Rich to the Poor.  Here, product cycles occur as a 
consequence of the world economy getting richer.  
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(importer) to a net importer (exporter) in some middle sectors, again generating something akin 
to product cycles.   And again, a globalization widens (narrows) the welfare gap between the 
Rich and the Poor when the goods produced in different sectors are substitutes (complements). 
When the two countries are unequal in size, the factor price is lower in the smaller 
country, reflecting its disadvantage of being smaller in the world of aggregate increasing returns 
due to the product variety effect. Globalization reduces (but never eliminates) this disadvantage, 
and causes the factor prices to converge (but never completely equalize) and hence the terms of 
trade to change in favor of the smaller country.9  This generates some additional effects.  If the 
smaller country has lower per capita labor endowment-- which includes the case where the two 
countries have the equal population size--, this country has lower standard-of-living regardless of 
the trade cost.  However, if the smaller country has higher per capita labor endowment, 
globalization can cause a leapfrogging due to such a terms-of-trade change.  At a high trade cost, 
the households in the smaller country might have a lower standard of living in spite of their 
higher labor endowment, because they benefit less from the product variety effect due to their 
disadvantage of living in a small country.  Globalization reduces this disadvantage enough so 
that they achieve a higher standard of living at a lower trade cost.  In our setup, this leads to a 
reversal of patterns of trade.  The smaller country with higher per capita labor endowment is a 
net exporter of the low income elastic goods at a higher trade cost, and a net exporter of the high 
income elastic goods at a lower trade cost.   
The present paper is most closely related to Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011).  
Their baseline model has two monopolistically competitive sectors, H & L, that produce 
indivisible products, which are horizontally differentiated within each sector and vertically 
differentiated across sectors.  In addition, there is a third sector that produces the divisible 
numeraire good competitively, which pins down the terms of trade between the two countries.  
Each household consumes one unit of a particular product from either H or L.  Building on the 
discrete choice model of consumer behaviors, they derive a nested logit demand system, with the 
property that the rich consumers are more likely than the poor to choose an H-product under the 
assumption that marginal utility of the numeraire good is higher when combined with an H- 
                                                             
9 This terms of trade effect of globalization is not due to the nonhomotheticity.  It exists even if the standard home 
market effect models with homothetic preferences, as will be shown in our extension of the Krugman model in 
section 3, which drops the assumption of the two countries being equal in size.   
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product.  By creating differences in demand structures through nonhomothetic preferences, they 
generate the patterns of trade where the Rich becomes a net-exporter of the high income elastic, 
high-quality H goods, while the Poor becomes a net exporter of low income elastic, low-quality 
L goods.  While highly elegant and original, their nested-logit demand system departs from those 
in the standard models of the home market effect in many dimensions.  This makes it difficult to 
isolate the effects of nonhomotheticity.  In contrast, our framework stays close to the standard 
models, which helps to isolate the effects of nonhomotheticity.  Our framework also allows us to 
conduct a variety of comparative statics with any number of sectors and the terms of trade effect.  
Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution across sectors is a separate parameter from the sector-
specific income elasticity parameters.  This means that it encompasses both the case where 
different sectors produce goods that are substitutes and the case where they produce goods that 
are complements, which turns out to be important for evaluating how the gains from productivity 
improvement and globalization are distributed between Rich and Poor countries.10  Needless to 
say, these comments should not be viewed as criticisms of the Fajgelbaum-Grossman-Helpman 
model.  Clearly, the two models have quite different structures and are developed with quite 
different objectives in mind and complement each other. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 proposes and analyzes our 
framework for studying the home market effect where the cross-country differences in the 
demand composition across a continuum of differentiated sectors are endogenously derived 
under nonhomothetic preferences.  For comparison, section 3 offers a home market effect model 
where the cross-country differences in the demand composition are due to the exogenous cross-
country taste differences.  This section might be of independent interest because it extends the 
Krugman (1980) model to the case of a continuum of sectors with general homothetic CES 
preferences without the mirror-image assumptions.  Section 4 adds a competitive sector, which 
produces the numeraire good, into our framework.  Hence, the framework presented in this 
section may be viewed as an extension of the Helpman and Krugman (1985, Ch.10) model of the 
                                                             
10The existing models can deal with just one of these two cases, due to the restriction imposed by the nonhomothetic 
preferences they used. In Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 
(2011), different sectors produce goods of different quality and lower prices of lower quality goods reduce the 
demand for higher quality goods.  Thus, different sectors produce substitutes in these models.  In contrast, in a 
hierarchical demand system of Matsuyama (2000), different sectors produce goods of different priority, and lower 
prices of necessities increase the demand for luxuries.  Thus, different sectors produce complements. 
©Kiminori Matsuyama, HME and Trade Between Rich & Poor 
8 
 
home market effect, which has one competitive sector and one differentiated goods sector, to the 
case of a continuum of differentiated goods sectors with differential income elasticities.  Section 
5 concludes.  The appendix offers two lemmas, which are used repeatedly in the analysis. 
 
2. The Home Market Effect with Nonhomothetic Preferences 
2.1    The Model 
Imagine the world economy that consists of two countries, indexed by j or k = 1 or 2.  
Country j is populated by jN  homogenous households.  There is a single nontradeable factor of 
production, which shall be called labor.   Each household in j supplies jh  units of effective labor 
inelastically at the wage rate, jw .  Thus, the income (and the expenditure) of each household in j 
is jjj hwE  and the total labor supply is jjj NhL  .  The number of households, jN , and its 
effective labor supply per household, jh , are the only possible sources of heterogeneity across 
the two countries. 
There is a continuum of monopolistic competitive sectors, indexed by ]1,0[s , each of 
which produces a continuum of tradable differentiated goods, indexed by 21 sss  , 
where js  ( j = 1 or 2) are disjoint sets of differentiated goods in sector s produced in country j in 
equilibrium. 
Household Budget Constraints and Preferences:   
Let )(ksc  denote per household consumption of variety sv   and )(
k
sp  the unit 
consumer price of variety sv   in country k = 1 or 2.  Then, with the per household 
expenditure, kkk hwE  , the budget constraint of each household in k is written as: 
(1) kkkks
k
s hwEdsdcp
s



 
1
0
)()(  . 
The preferences of each household have a two-tier structure.  At the lower level, the 
consumption of differentiated varieties within each sector is aggregated by the usual Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator, ksC
~
, ]1,0[s , defined by: 
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(2)    1
11)(~









 


 
s
dcC ks
k
s ; σ > 1.   
At the upper-level, these Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators are aggregated by the utility function, kU~ = 
 ]1,0[,~ sCU ks , which are given implicitly by 
(3)     1~~)(1
0
1)(1


dsCU ks
s
k
s




 ; 0s  and 1 , 
with  )(s  for 10   or   )(0 s  for 1 , which implies     01/)(   s .  These 
parameter restrictions ensure that kU~ =  ]1,0[,~ sCU ks  is globally monotone increasing and 
globally quasi-concave in ksC
~
, ]1,0[s .  Without further loss of generality, we normalize )(s  
such that 1)(
1
0
 dss .  In addition, it is assumed    so that differentiated goods are closer 
substitutes within each sector than across sectors.  
The utility function (3) is implicitly, additively separable with constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES), a class of utility functions, introduced by Hanoch (1975).   The standard 
homothetic CES preferences, 
 
11
0
11
1 ~)(~










 


 dsCU kss
k ,  
is a special case of (3), where 1)( s  for all ]1,0[s .  By letting )(s dependent on s, this class 
of utility functions allows for the income elasticity to differ across sectors, while keeping the 
price elasticity, η, constant across sectors.  In what follows, we assume that the sectors can be 
ordered such that )(s is strictly increasing in s.  Then,   


)(1 ~)(
s
k
s U , the coefficient on the 
term   
 1~ k
sC  in (3), is log-supermodular in s and 
kU~ .  By applying Lemma 1 (See Appendix), 
for   




)(1 ~)()~;(ˆ
s
k
s
k UUsg , this implies that, as kU~  goes up, the household cares more about 
the higher-indexed goods in the sense that the density function of the weights attached to 
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different sectors satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property and that its cumulative 
distribution function satisfies the first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) property. 
Household Maximization: 
Each household in k maximizes kU~ =  ]1,0[,~ sCU ks , where ksC~  is defined by (2) and 
 U  is defined implicitly by (3), subject to the budget constraint, (1).   This maximization 
problem can be solved in two stages.   At the first stage, each household chooses )(ksc  for 
s to:  
Maximize   1
11)(~









 


 
s
dcC ks
k
s ,   
subject to ks
k
s
k
s Edcp
s
  )()( ,  
where ksE  is the household’s expenditure in sector-s.  The solution to this problem is well-known 
and given by: 
(4) 
 
 
k
sk
s
k
sk
sk
s
k
sk
s E
P
pC
P
pc 


 







 1
)()()( ,   where  
(5)     





 
1
1
1)(
s
dpP ks
k
s  
is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index of differentiated goods in sector-s in country k, which the 
households treat as given, and ksC  is the maximized value of 
k
sC
~
, satisfying ks
k
s
k
s CPE  .   At the 
second stage, each household choose ks
k
s
k
s CPE   to: 
Maximize kU~ ,  
subject to     1~)(1
0
1)(1


dsCU ks
s
k
s




  and kks
k
s
k
s EdsEdsCP  
1
0
1
0
.   
The solution to this problem can be written in terms of the expenditure share of sector-s, ksm : 
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(6) 
   
 
   
   




 1
0
1)(
1)(
1
1)(
dtPU
PU
E
PU
E
CP
E
Em
k
t
tk
t
k
s
sk
s
k
k
s
sk
s
k
k
s
k
s
k
k
sk
s






, with  1
1
0
 dsmks  
where kU  is the maximized value of kU~ , which is given implicitly as a function of kE  and the 
price indices, ksP , as follows: 
(7)      


1
0
1)(1 dsPUE ks
sk
s
k   .11 
Recall the parameter restrictions that ensure the global monotonicity of the utility function, (3); 
 )(s  for 10   and   )(0 s  for 1 .  Thus, LHS of (7) is strictly increasing 
(decreasing) in kE  if and only if RHS of (7) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in kU .   This 
implies that kU is strictly increasing in kE .12    
From Eq.(6), we could write the relative expenditure share of any two sectors as: 
 )/log( '
k
s
k
s mm  = )/log( 'ss    )log()'()( kUss   )/log()1( 'ksks PP  , 
and the relative household demand curve as:   
)/log( '
k
s
k
s CC  = )/log( 'ss    )log()'()( kUss   )/log( 'ksks PP .  
This shows not only that the relative demand for a higher-indexed sector has higher income 
elasticity.  It also shows that the slope of the Engel curve, )log(/)/log( '
kk
s
k
s UCC  = 
                                                             
11If we define the aggregate price index, kP , by kkk UPE  , kU could be interpreted as the real aggregate 
consumption per capita.   Furthermore, eq.(6) could be written as:  
   
 
  )()(
)( sk
sk
k
s
s
sk
k
k
s
s
k
s E
P
PU
P
PC 



 









 , where      


1
0
11)(1 dsPUP ks
sk
s
k   .    
However, unlike the price indices of each sector, ksP , we cannot treat the aggregate price index, kP , as fixed, when 
deriving the household demand, since the weights attached on sectors to construct this index depends on kU .  
12 This can be also verified by partially differentiating (7) with respect to kE  to obtain 
 
 
   
   














1
0
1)(
1
0
1)(
1
)(log
log
dsPUs
dsPU
E
U
k
s
sk
s
k
s
sk
s
k
k






 > 0. 
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)'()( ss   , is independent of  the real aggregate consumption per capita (or the standard-of-
living), kU .  Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2015) offers the empirical evidence in support of 
the log-linear Engel curves implied by implicitly additively separable preferences with CES 
(against the Engel curves implied by the Stone-Geary preferences).   
Notice also that       1)( kssks PU is log-supermodular in s and kU .  Hence, by 
applying Lemma 1 for       1)(),(ˆ kssksk PUUsg ,  eq.(6) shows that, holding the price 
indices constant, the household with a higher kE  (and hence a higher kU ) allocates larger shares 
of their expenditure towards higher-indexed goods in the sense that the density function of the 
expenditure share across sectors function satisfies the MLR property and that its cumulative 
distribution function satisfies the FSD property. 
Iceberg Costs and Aggregate Demand for Differentiated Goods: 
The unit consumer price of each differentiated good, )(ksp , 
j
s , depends on k, 
because of the (iceberg) trade costs;  To consume one unit of js  in country k, jk  units need 
to be shipped from j.  Thus, with the unit factory price, )(jsp , 
j
s , )(
k
sp  = 
)( jsjk p )(
j
sp .  Then, from (4) and (6), each household in k demands for 
j
s  by  
)( ksjkc jk         ksskks PUE )(    )(ksp   
= jk         ksskks PUE )(    )(jsjk p = jk         ksskks PUE )(    )(jsp , 
where   11   jkjk .  Since there are kN households in k, the aggregate demand for js  
can be expressed as:  
(8) )(sD  =
 ))(( js
j
s pA ,  
where 
(9)  k
k
sjk
j
s bA  ;  
(10) ksb      


 k
s
kskk
s PNUE
)(
         kskksks PNPU )(  
where jsA  may be interpreted as the aggregate demand shift parameter for a variety produced in 
sector-s in country j; ksb  as the aggregate demand shift parameter for sector-s in country k; and 
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jk  is the weight attached to the aggregate spending by country k of varieties produced in 
country j.   Eqs. (8)-(10) show that the demand curve for each variety has a constant price 
elasticity with its demand shift parameter, jsA , depending on the trade costs in a manner familiar 
in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition models of trade.  What is new is that the 
household utility level, kU , has differential impacts on the demand shift parameters across 
sectors due to the nonhomotheticity of preferences.  
For the remainder of this paper, we follow Krugman (1980) and others by assuming that 
12211    and 12112   , so that 
(11) 12211    and  2112    
  1  < 1.   
Thus, )1,0[  measures how much each household spends on an imported variety relative to 
what it would spend in the absence of the trade cost; it is inversely related to  , with 0  for 
  and 1  for 1 . 
Production and Pricing By Monopolistically Competitive Firms: 
 Each differentiated variety is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm.  
Producing one unit of each differentiated variety in sector-s requires s units of labor, so that the 
marginal cost is equal to s
jw  for js .  Eq. (8) shows that the price elasticity of demand for 
each variety is constant,  .  Since all the varieties in the same sector in the same country have 
the identical marginal cost, they all set the same price, given by: 
(12) js
s
j
j
s p
w
p 





/11
)(  for all js , 
and from (8),  they are all produced by the same amount, given by: 
(13)  )( js
j
s
j
s pAy . 
By inserting (12) into (5), 
(14)    


s
dpP ks
k
s 
 11 )(  =   

j
k
sjkj
s
dp  1)( = j jsjkjs pV  1)(  
where jsV  is the Lebesgue measure of 
j
s , the equilibrium measure of varieties produced (and of 
active firms) in sector-s of country j. 
Free Entry Conditions and Distribution of Firms Across Sectors:  
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This equilibrium measure, jsV , is determined by the free entry condition.  To enter sector-
s, all monopolistically competitive firms need to pay the setup cost per variety, s , in labor, and 
they have incentive to do so, as long as the profit is non-negative.  Thus, in equilibrium, either a 
positive measure of firms (and varieties) enter, in which case they all make zero profit 
(  0jsV   0 sjssjjsjsjs ywyp  ), or no firms (and varieties) enter, because they would 
earn negative profit if they enter ( 0js 0
j
sV ).  Using (13), this free entry condition can be 
written as the complementarity slackness condition:  
0jsV ; 
 )( js
j
s
j
s pAy ss  /)1(   . 
In what follows, we use the following normalizations to keep the notation simple.  First, let us 
choose the unit of each differentiated good in sector-s such that  /11s .  This implies  
(15) jjs wp   for all ]1,0[s . 
Second, let us choose the units of the measure of varieties in each sector, such that  /1s .  
These two normalizations jointly imply that the free entry condition can be now written as: 
(16) 0jsV ; 1)( 
jj
s
j
s wAy    for all ]1,0[s  and j = 1 and 2. 
In other words, we choose the units such that each (active) firm sells its good at jjs wp  , produce 
by 1jsy , and hire labor by 1 s
j
ss y   to break even in equilibrium.   Furthermore, since 
each active firm hires labor by 1 s
j
ss y  , the labor demand by sector-s of country j is 
j
sV .   
By integrating across sectors, the labor market clearing condition is given by jjjjs NhLdsV 
1
0
, 
which means that the distribution of firms across sectors can be written as:   
(17)  j
j
s
j
t
j
sj
s L
V
dtV
Vf 

1
0
. 
Equilibrium Conditions: 
We are now ready to consolidate all the equilibrium conditions.   From (9), (11), (16) and 
(17), the complementary slackness condition for free entry in each sector and in each country is 
given by: 
©Kiminori Matsuyama, HME and Trade Between Rich & Poor 
15 
 
(18) 01 sf ; 1))(( 121   wbb ss ;  & 0
2 sf ; 1))(( 221   wbb ss  for all s, 
where ksb , given in (10), can be rewritten, by using the expenditure share, 
k
sm , given in (6), in 
two different ways.  First, by eliminating the terms kU  from (6) and (10) and using 
kkkkkkk LwNhwNE  , we obtain  
(19) 1))((  ks
kkk
s
k
s PLwmb . 
Second, by eliminating the terms ksP  from (6) and (10), we obtain 
(20) ksb         















 




 11
1
))(( k
s
sk
s
kkk mUNhw . 
Next, from (11), (14), (15), and (17), the price index in each sector and in each country becomes: 
(21)     1222111111 )()()( wLfwLfP sss ; 
    1222111112 )()()( wLfwLfP sss  for all 
]1,0[s . 
Finally, the market size distribution and the firm distribution across sectors must add up to one in 
each country.  
(22) 1
1
0
 dsmks  for k = 1 and 2. 
(23)  1
1
0
 dsf js  for j = 1 and 2. 
 
2.2 Autarky Equilibrium 
First, let us consider the case of autarky, ρ = 0, where each differentiated good must be 
produced in the country of consumption.  Then, there is a positive entry in each sector in each 
country.   From (18), this implies ksb
)( kw  for all ]1,0[s  and for k = 1 and 2.   Inserting this 
to (19), (20) and (21) yields 
(24) ks
k
s mf        














 





1
))((
0
1
sk
s
kk UNh . 
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Subscript “0” is added here to indicate that kU0  is the equilibrium value of the utility level, or the 
standard-of-living, achieved in autarky (ρ = 0).  Note that eq. (24) shows that the firms are 
distributed proportionately with market sizes in autarky.  
By integrating (24) across all the sectors and using (22) or (23), we can pin down kU0  as 
      11
0
1
))((
0
1

















dsUNh sks
kk 




 , 
which can be written more compactly as 
(25)  kk xuU 00    with     kkkkk LhNhx 10   , 
where  u  is defined implicitly by 
(26)      

















1
0
1
))((1 )( dsxux ss 




 .  
Lemma 2-i) in the appendix shows that  u , defined in eq.(26), is a strictly increasing function.  
Thus, the utility level, or the standard-of-living, in autarky, increases with kx0    kk Nh   
  kk Lh 1 .  It obviously increases in each household’s labor endowment, kh .  It also increases 
with kN .  This is due to the familiar aggregate increasing returns to scale in the presence of 
“love for variety” and the fixed cost.  Living in an economy with a larger population size is 
beneficial as it allows the households to share the fixed cost of adding more varieties of products 
to consume.  Notice that the condition for )( 10
1
0 xuU   < )(
2
0
2
0 xuU  can be expressed as 
    212111 LhLh    , which may occur even if 21 hh   when 21 LL  .  In other words, the 
country with higher per capita labor endowment may have a lower standard-of-living when it is 
smaller.  This is because those living in a small country has disadvantage in the presence of 
aggregate increasing returns.13 
                                                             
13 This result does not contradict what we noted earlier, i.e., eq.(7) shows that the household’s utility is increasing in 
per capita labor endowment, holding the price indices given.  When comparing the two countries in equilibrium, the 
price indices differ across the two countries because the measure of varieties produced in each sector in each country 
is endogenously determined by the free entry condition. 
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Furthermore, plugging (25) and (26) into (24) yields the autarky equilibrium density of 
firms and market sizes across sectors as follows:  
(27) ks
k
s mf 
  
 
  
   


































1
0
1
))((
0
1
))((
0
1
0
1
))((
0
)(
)()(
dtxu
xu
x
xu
tk
t
sk
s
k
sk
s













. 
The numerator of (27) is log-supermodular in s and kx0 .  Thus, by applying Lemma 1 for 
   







 



1
))((
00 )(),(ˆ
sk
s
k xuxsg , eq.(27) shows that, for )()( 20
2
0
1
0
1
0 xuUxuU  , the 
households in country 2, whose standard-of-living is higher than those in country 1, spend 
relatively more on higher-indexed goods in the sense that 21 / ss mm  is strictly decreasing in s (that 
is, the density functions of equilibrium market size distribution across sectors satisfies the MLR 
property)  as well as in the sense that the cumulative distribution function for country 2 first-
order stochastically dominates (FSD) the cumulative distribution function for country 1. 
Notice the difference between the two expressions of ksm , eq.(6) and eq.(27), in particular 
how it depends on the household utility.  Eq.(6) implies that, holding the price indices given, the 
relative market size of two sectors, 'ss  , responds to an increase in kU  as 
 k
k
s
k
s
U
mm
log
)/log( '


 = )'()( ss    > 0.   
However, such a change in the relative market size causes some entries into higher-indexed 
sectors, and exits from lower-indexed sectors, which reduces the relative price indices of high-
indexed goods, which amplifies (dampens) the shift in expenditure shares if different sectors 
produce substitutes (complements).  Indeed, from eq. (24) or (27), it is easy to show that, in 
equilibrium, the relative market size of two sectors, 'ss  , responds to an increase in kU  as 
 k
k
s
k
s
U
mm
log
)/log( '


 =   











1)'()( ss  ,  
where )/()1(   >(<) 1captures the amplifying (dampening) effect of endogenous entries 
and exits for η >(<) 1. 
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The above amplification or dampening effect also affects the welfare impact of a change 
in kx0 .  From Lemma 2-ii) shown in the appendix,    log/log dxud  =   )(/' xuxxu   
)( x is increasing (decreasing) in x if η >(<) 1.  In words, welfare gains from a percentage 
increase in kx0  is higher (lower) at a higher x if η >(<) 1.  This implies, among other things, that a 
uniform productivity improvement,  11 / hh  0/ 22  hh , magnifies (reduces) the relative gap 
in the standard-of-living between the two countries, 1)(/)(/ 10
2
0
1
0
2
0  xuxuUU , if different 
sectors produce substitutes (complements). 
 
2.3 Trade Equilibrium and Patterns of Trade 
In what follows, let us focus on the case 01 sf  and 0
2 sf  for all ]1,0[s .  Then, (18) 
is simplified to 21 ss bb   = 
)( 1w  and 21 ss bb   = 
)( 2w  and hence  
(28) 2
21
1
1
)()(

 



wwbs  and 2
12
2
1
)()(

 



wwbs   for all ]1,0[s . 
By inserting (28) into (19) and using (21), we obtain   
(29)     12221111 )()( wLfwLf ss   

)()(
))(1(
21
1112
ww
mLw s


  
     12221111 )()( wLfwLf ss   

)()(
))(1(
12
2222
ww
mLw s


  
for all ]1,0[s .  Integrating these expressions across all sectors and using (22) and (23),  
    122111 )()( wLwL  
 

)()(
))(1(
21
112
ww
Lw


 , 
   122111 )()( wLwL  
 

)()(
))(1(
12
222
ww
Lw


 ,  
either of which can be rewritten as: 
(30) 2
1
L
L  =   





)(1
)(1)(; 12




 ,   
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where 21 / ww  is the relative factor price and  ;  is strictly increasing in 
),( /1/1     and satisfies   0;lim
/1




,   1;1   , and   



;lim
/1
.   
Figure 1 illustrates eq.(30), which determines the (factor) terms of trade 21 / ww  as a 
function of the relative labor supply, 21 / LL , for a given level of 0 < ρ < 1.  It shows that 
21 / ww  is strictly increasing in 21 / LL  and 1/ 21  ww  if and only if 1/ 21 LL .  Thus, 
the factor price is higher in the larger economy, which reflects the aggregate increasing returns to 
scale pointed out earlier.14  It also shows the lower and upper bounds for the terms of trade, 
),( /1/1    .  The arrows indicate the effects of an increase in ρ.  As shown, it flattens the 
graph, thereby causing a factor price convergence.  This is because globalization, captured by a 
reduction in τ and hence an increase in ρ, reduces the smaller country’s disadvantage. 
In addition, combining (28) and (20) yields  
(31)    















 







 










1
))((1
1
112
1
)(1
))(1( s
ss U
Nhm ,  
    























 










1
))((2
1
222
2
)(1
))(1( s
ss U
Nhm . 
Here, the subscript “ρ” is added to indicate that kU , the equilibrium standard-of-living achieved 
in each country under trade, depends on ρ.  By integrating (31) across all the sectors and using 
(22), we obtain  
(32)  11  xuU  ,  with    

 




)(1
)1( 1121 Nhx  




)(1
)1( 10
2 x
;   
 22  xuU  ,   with  

 

)(1
)1( 2222



Nhx  

)(1
)1( 20
2



x
, 
                                                             
14 Note that eq.(30) implies         )(/)(;/ 2211 LwLw , which is strictly increasing in   
(hence also in 21 / LL ) and 2211 / LwLw < 1 if and only if   < 1 (hence also if and only if 21 / LL < 1).   Thus, the 
larger economy is larger regardless of whether it is measured in the total labor supply or in the aggregate GDP. 
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where  u  is the same increasing function defined implicitly by (26).  Note that the welfare 
effects of globalization on each country are summarized by a single index, kx .  Note also that the 
lower and upper bound on the terms of trade established earlier, ),( /1/1    , which can be 
seen in Figure 1, ensures gains from trade for both countries;  /1  implies  11  xuU   > 
 1010 xuU   and   /1  implies  22  xuU   >  2020 xuU  . 
Plugging (32) back into (31) and using the definition of  u , given by (26), yields the 
equilibrium density function of the market size distribution across sectors in each country as 
follows.  
(33) 
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   for k = 1 and 2. 
Note that    






 



1
))(()( sks xu  is log-supermodular in s and 
kx .  Hence, by applying Lemma 1 
for    







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
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 
1
))(()(),(ˆ sks
k xuxsg , it follows from eq. (33) that, for  11  xuU   <  22  xuU  , 
the households in country 2, whose standard-of-living is higher than those in country 1, spend 
relatively more on higher-indexed goods in the sense that 21 / ss mm  is strictly decreasing in s (that 
is, the density functions of the equilibrium market size distribution across sectors satisfies the 
MLR property)  as well as in the sense that the cumulative distribution function for country 2 
first-order stochastically dominates (FSD) the cumulative distribution function for country 1.   In 
shorts, the country with higher standard-of-living has relatively larger domestic markets in 
higher-indexed sectors.  The MLR property can also be seen by taking the ratio from (33) to 
obtain  
(34) 
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Clearly, this is strictly decreasing in s if  11  xuU   <  22  xuU   and strictly increasing in s  if 
 11  xuU   >  22  xuU  . 
Unlike in autarky, the firm distribution in each country is no longer proportional to the 
market size distribution in that country.  By solving (29) for 1sf  and 
2
sf  and using (30), we 
obtain the equilibrium density function of the firm distribution across sectors in each country as 
follows:  
(35) 








)(1
)( 211 ss
s
mmf  > 0; 



)(1
)( 122


 sss
mmf > 0, 
which requires     )(/)( 121 ss mm .   Furthermore, the ratio of the two,  
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is increasing in 21 / ss mm  and satisfies 1//
2121  ssss mmff , 1//
2121  ssss mmff , or 
1// 2121  ssss mmff . 
Figure 2 illustrates eq.(34) and eq.(36) for the case of  11  xuU   <  22  xuU  .  In this 
case, 21 / ss mm  is strictly decreasing in s and hence 
21 / ss ff  is also strictly decreasing in s.  
Furthermore, there is a unique cutoff sector, sc )1,0( , such that 1// 2121  ssss mmff  holds 
below the cutoff and 1// 2121  ssss mmff  above the cutoff.  Thus, disproportionately larger 
fractions of firms operate in lower-indexed sectors in the country with lower-standard-of-living, 
precisely because their domestic markets are relatively larger in lower-indexed sectors, which 
produce low income elastic goods.  Likewise, disproportionately larger fractions of firms operate 
in the higher-indexed sectors in the country with higher standard-of-living, precisely because 
their domestic markets are relatively larger in the higher-indexed sectors, which produce high 
income elastic goods. 
This disproportional effect of the market size distribution on the firm distribution under 
trade translates into the patterns of intra-sectoral trade across sectors, and the country with higher 
(lower) standard-of-living becomes a net exporter (importer) above the cutoff and a net importer 
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(exporter) above the cutoff, as indicated in Figure 2.  To see this, recall that the households in k 
spend     111 )()()( jks
j
s
k
s
k
s
k
s wbpbpb  per variety produced in sector-s of country j ≠ k.  
With the measure of varieties produced in this sector, jsV , the total gross export value from j to k 
in sector-s is jjks
j
s
jk
s
j
s LwbfwbV
    11 )()( .  Thus, the net export value from 1 to 2 in sector-s 
is given by 21 ss NXNX   =  2121211121 )()( LwbfLwbf ssss    .  Using (28), (30) and (35), this 
can be further rewritten as:  
(37) 21 ss NXNX   21
22
)( ss
mmLw 


 

  =  21
11
)( ss
mmLw 
 

 . 
Thus, 21 ss NXNX   > 0 for s < sc and 
21
ss NXNX   < 0 for s > sc when  11  xuU   < 
 22  xuU  .   This is due to the home market effect a la Krugman (1980), except that the cross-
country difference in the market size distribution across sectors is due to nonhomothetic 
preferences in this model, not due to the exogenous cross-country variations in taste assumed in 
Krugman (1980).    
 It is also worth emphasizing that country 1 becomes a net exporter in sectors where 
21
ss mm   holds, which are not necessarily sectors where 
222111 LwmLwm ss   holds.  What 
determines the direction of net sectoral trade flows in a general equilibrium model of the home 
market effect is not the cross-country difference in the market size in each sector.  What matters 
is the cross-country difference in the demand compositions, i.e., in the cross-country difference 
in the market size distributions across sectors.15 
 
2.4 Ranking the Countries 
 Having established that the country with higher (lower) standard-of-living becomes the net 
exporter in higher (lower)-indexed sectors, our remaining task is to rank the two countries in 
                                                             
15 The home market effect is often described simply as “relatively large domestic demand gives competitive 
advantages to exporting firms.”  To this, we have heard some IO people say something to the effect that the share of 
the domestic sale must be trivial for most exporting firms based in small economies like Denmark or Switzerland.  
The result here should explain why such a criticism is unwarranted.  Even if the Swiss domestic market might be 
small relative to the EU market in every sector, Swiss domestic markets have to be larger in some sectors relatively 
to other sectors, when compared to the EU, as long as their demand composition differs from the EU.   And that is 
what determines the patterns of comparative advantage in a general equilibrium model of the home market effect. 
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terms of the standard-of-living.  This is simple when the two countries are in equal size, 
LLL  21 .  In this case, ω = 1 so that     LhNhxx kkkkk 10 )1()1()1(    , and 
hence , 21 /  xx  =   121 / hh  =   12211 / hwhw  .  Thus, the country with higher per capita labor 
endowment has higher standard-of-living.  This country also has higher per capita income.  
 Generally, the condition under which Country 1 becomes the net-exporter of the lower 
income elastic goods and Country 2 becomes the net-exporter of the higher income elastic goods, 
 11  xuU   <  22  xuU   or 21  xx   can be written as:   
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which can be further rewritten as:  
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 To understand this condition, it would be useful to compare it with the conditions under 
which Country 1 is poorer under autarky,  1010 xuU   <  2020 xuU   and Country 1 has lower per 
capita income, 2211 hwhw  , which can be written as: 
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respectively.  Figure 3 illustrates these conditions.  The black curve depicts the graph of 
 ;/~/ 2121 hhLL   on which  11  xuU   =  22  xuU   holds.  It is downward-sloping, and 
 11  xuU   <  22  xuU   holds below and to the left of this curve, and  11  xuU   >  22  xuU   
holds above and to the right of this curve.  The red curve depicts the graph of    12121 // hhLL , 
on which  1010 xuU   =  2020 xuU   holds.  It is also downward-sloping and  1010 xuU   < 
 2020 xuU   holds below and to the left of this curve, and  1010 xuU   >  2020 xuU   holds above 
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and to the right of this curve.  The blue curve depicts the graph of  ;// 2121 hhLL   , on 
which 2211 hwhw   holds.  It is also downward-sloping and 2211 hwhw  holds below and to the 
left of this curve, and 2211 hwhw  holds above and to the right of this curve.  It is also easy to 
verify that  ;1  =  ;1~  = 1 and  
 
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1
h
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as shown in Figure 3. 
 For 21 / LL  = 1, all three curves intersect at 21 / hh  = 1.  Hence, 21 / hh  < 1 implies 
2
0
1
0 UU  , 
21
 UU   and 
2211 hwhw  , while 21 / hh  > 1 implies 20
1
0 UU  , 
21
 UU   and 
2211 hwhw  .  Thus, when the two countries are equal in size, comparing per capita labor 
endowment alone can determine which country becomes richer, as already pointed out.   When 
the two countries are unequal in size, these three conditions diverge.  To see this, consider the 
case of 21 / hh  > 1.  For    12121 // hhLL , 2010 UU  , 21  UU   and 2211 hwhw  .  Thus, when 
the country with higher per capita labor endowment is not too smaller or larger in size, it has 
higher standard-of-living both under autarky and under trade, and it becomes the net exporter of 
higher income elastic goods.  It also has higher per capita income.  For   1// 12121  hhLL , 
however, the country with higher per capita labor endowment has lower standard-of-living in 
autarky.  When the condition (38) holds, this country has lower standard-of-living and is the net-
exporter of the lower income elastic goods.  Notice that (38) is more stringent than 
   12121 // hhLL < 1.  In other words, for  ;/~ 21 hh  <    12121 // hhLL  < 1, the standard-of-
living in this country is lower in autarky but higher under trade, because trade reduces this 
country’s disadvantage of being smaller.  Notice also that the condition (38) is less stringent than 
21 / LL  <  ;/ 21 hh  < 1, the condition under which its per capita income becomes smaller.  In 
other words, for  ;/ 21 hh  < 21 / LL  <  ;/~ 21 hh  < 1, the standard-of-living in this country is 
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lower even when its per capita income is still higher in this country.  This can occur because this 
country benefits less from the variety effect due to its smaller size. 
 
2.5 Comparative Statics 
 Having characterized the patterns of trade, we now turn to comparative static exercises. 
2.5.1  Uniform Productivity Improvement 
 First, consider the effects of a uniform productivity improvement.  That is, labor 
productivity goes up at the same rate in all the activities in both countries.  This can be captured 
by )log( 1h = )log( 2h )log(h > 0.  This keeps 21 / hh  and 21 / LL unchanged, with )log( 1L  = 
)log( 2L  = )log(h > 0.  Therefore, 21 / ww  is also unchanged, and so are 20
1
0 / xx  and 
21 /  xx ,  with )log(
1
0x = )log(
2
0x = )log(
1
x  = )log(
2
x  = )log(h > 0. 
 With )log( 1x  = )log(
2
x  > 0, both )(
11
 xuU   and )(
22
 xuU   go up.  With their 
standard-of-living improving, the households in both countries shift their expenditure shares 
towards higher-indexed sectors in the sense of both MLR and FSD.   This can be seen from 
eq.(33) and applying Lemma 1 for    







 


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1
))(()(),(ˆ sks
k xuxsg .   
 Even though 1x  and 
2
x  goes up at the same rate to keep 
21 /  xx  unchanged, the standard-
of-living in the two countries do not go up at the same rate.   To see this,  
 
)log(
)/log( 21
h
UU

   = 
)log(
))(log())(log( 21
h
xuxu

  =     21   xx  .   
Hence, from Lemma 2-ii),  
(39) 
)log(
)/log(
sgn
21
h
UU

   = )1sgn(  )sgn( 21  xx  . 
Thus, the standard-of-living goes up at a faster rate in the Richer country if 1  and in the 
Poorer country if 1 .  In words, welfare gaps widen (narrow) if the goods produced in 
different sectors are substitutes (complements) . 
 To see how the patterns of trade change, log-differentiate (34) to yield,  
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and then use (39) to obtain 
(40) 


)log(
)/log(sgn
21
h
mm ss    )(sgn s )1sgn(  )sgn( 21  xx  = )sgn( 12  xx  . 
from Lemma 2-ii) and by recalling the parameter restriction,   0)1/()(   s , that ensures 
the monotonicity of the upper-tier utility function. 
Figure 4 illustrates this for )( 11  xuU  < )(
22
 xuU  .  In this case, the downward-sloping 
curve, 21 / ss mm , shifts up, which causes the cutoff sector, cs , to move up.  As a result, the Rich’s 
trade balances switch from net surpluses to net deficits in some middle sectors.16  The intuition 
behind this result is easy to grasp.  As the standard-of-living improves in both countries, the 
households everywhere shift their expenditure shares towards the higher-indexed sectors.  In 
response, both countries reallocate their resources towards higher-indexed sectors.  In other 
words, the relative weights of higher-indexed sectors, in which the Rich runs surpluses, go up 
and the relative weights of lower-indexed sectors, in which the Poor runs surpluses, go down.  
This means that, in order to keep the overall trade account between the two countries in balance, 
the Rich’s sectoral trade account must deteriorate in each sector.  This is why the Rich switches 
from being a net exporter to being a net importer in some middle sectors. 
 
2.5.2 Globalization Without Terms of Trade Change 
 Next, consider the effects of globalization, captured by a trade cost reduction, or a 
higher   1)( .   First, let us look at the case where the two countries are in equal size: 
LLL  21 .  In this case, the factor price is always equalized, www  21 , or ω = 1, 
independent of ρ, so that kk xx 0)1(    =    kk Nh )1(   =   Lhk 1)1(   , and hence , 
21 /  xx = 
2
0
1
0 / xx  =   121 / hh , as noted earlier.  That is, the country with higher standard-of-
                                                             
16 For )( 11  xuU  > )(
22
 xuU  , the upward-sloping curve, 
21 / ss mm , shifts down, which also leads to the cutoff 
sector, cs , to move up.  Either way, the Rich’s trade balances must switch from net surpluses to net deficits in some 
middle sectors. 
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living is the one with per capita labor endowment and with higher per capita income.17  Hence, 
the country whose households have higher per capita labor endowment is always a net exporter 
in higher-indexed sectors and a net importer in lower-indexed sectors, precisely because they 
have relatively larger expenditure shares in higher-indexed sectors, which causes 
disproportionately larger shares of firms to enter higher-indexed sectors due to the home market 
effect. 
 Furthermore, in this case, the effects of globalization, a higher  , can be seen only by 
looking at kx  = 
kx0)1(   =   Lhk 1)1(   .  Indeed, without causing any terms-of-trade change, 
the effects of a higher   is isomorphic to a uniform productivity improvement, with 
)1log(  > 0 equivalent to )log()1( 1h  = )log()1( 2h )log()1( h  > 0.   Hence, 
by going through the analysis as done in the previous subsection, one can show that, in both 
countries, the standard-of-living improves (a higher kU  ), and the households shift their 
expenditure shares towards higher-indexed sectors both in the sense of MLR and FSD.   
Furthermore, one can show:  
)1log(
)/log(
sgn
21



 UU
 = )1sgn(  )sgn( 21  xx  . 
so that globalization causes the welfare gap between the Rich and the Poor to widen (narrow) if 
the goods produced in different sectors are substitutes (complements).  One can also show: 
)1log(
)/log(sgn
21

 ss mm  = )sgn( 12  xx  , 
so that the cutoff sector moves up (see Figure 4).  Thus, the Rich country, the country whose 
households have higher per capita labor endowment, switches from a net exporter to a net 
importer in some middle sectors, generating something akin to product cycles without any 
technology diffusion from the Rich to the Poor. 
 In summary, when the two countries are equal in size, globalization causes no terms-of- 
trade change.  And without any terms-of-trade change, globalization is isomorphic to the effects 
of uniform productivity improvement, because it allows the households everywhere to have 
better assess to the varieties produced abroad,    
                                                             
17 In this case, the two countries have the same aggregate GDP, but differ in GDP per capita.   
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2.5.3 Globalization With Terms of Trade Change: Possibility of Leapfrogging and 
Reversal of the Patterns of Trade 
When the two countries are unequal in size, the factor price is lower in the smaller 
country, due to the disadvantage of being smaller in the presence of aggregate increasing returns.  
The larger the trade cost, the greater this disadvantage.  Globalization reduces this disadvantage 
for the smaller country, thereby causing the terms of trade change in favor of the smaller country, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
When the smaller country has lower per capita labor endowment, this country always has 
lower standard-of-living, regardless of the trade cost.  However, when the smaller country has 
higher per capita labor endowment, it is possible that this country has lower standard-of-living at 
a high trade cost but higher standard-of-living at a low trade cost.  This possibility is illustrated 
in Figure 5, which reproduces some parts of Figure 3.  Below and to the left of the red curve, 
Country 1 has lower standard-of-living than Country 2 in autarky.  Below and to the left of the 
black curve, Country 1 has lower standard-of-living than Country 2 under trade.  Globalization, a 
higher ρ, rotates the black curve clockwise, as indicated by the arrows.   As ρ approaches zero, 
the black curve converges to the red curve, which is invariant to the trade cost.  As ρ approaches 
one, the black curve converges to the vertical line, 21 / hh  = 1.  Now, consider the case where 
Country 1 has higher per capita labor endowment, i.e., 21 / hh > 1 but it is sufficiently smaller so 
that  21 / LL  < 121 )/( hh  < 1.  Thus, we consider the point, ( 21 / hh , 21 / LL ), located to the right of 
the vertical line, 21 / hh  = 1 and below the red curve.   Then, with a sufficiently small ρ, the black 
curve passes above and to the right of this point, which means that Country 1 has lower standard-
of-living.  With a sufficiently large ρ, the black curve passes below and to the left of this point, 
which means the Country 1 has higher standard-of-living.  Thus, closer to autarky, Country 1 is 
poorer due to its disadvantage of being smaller in the presence of aggregate increasing returns, 
hence running surpluses in lower-indexed sectors.  Globalization reduces the disadvantage of 
being smaller, causing a factor price convergence, which makes it richer, hence running 
surpluses in higher-indexed sectors.  This result thus suggests the possibility that some relatively 
small countries with relatively highly educated labor forces, which might initially have lower 
standard-of-living due to their remote locations and export relatively low income elastic goods, 
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might benefit more from globalization and emerge as exporters of relatively high income elastic 
goods. 
 
3.    The Home Market Effect with Exogenous Taste Variations: A Comparison 
In the model developed in the previous section, the cross-country differences in the 
demand composition behind the home market effect come from the nonhomotheticity of 
preferences.  However, nonhomotheticity are not responsible for all the results.  Some of them 
are due to the home market effect in general, regardless of the sources of the differences in the 
demand composition.   To clarify which results are driven by the nonhomotheticity, let us modify 
the previous model, in which the upper-tier utility function is now given by the standard 
homothetic CES preferences, where the households in the two countries attach different weights 
on sectors.  More specifically, the upper-level utility function, (3), is now replaced by:  
(3’)    
11
0
11
1 ~)(]1,0[,~










 


 dsCsCU ks
k
s
k
s
k ,  ks  > 0, normalized to 1)(
1
0
1
 

dsks


 . 
Notice that, ks , the weight on the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator 
k
sC
~
, now depends on k.  Furthermore, 
let us assume that the sectors can be ordered such that 21 / ss   is strictly decreasing in s.  That is, 
the households in country 1 put relatively more weights on the lower-indexed goods.   All other 
features of the model are left unchanged.  The Krugman (1980) model can be viewed as a limit 
case of the model in this section, where  η = 1, 21 LL  , and 1/ 21   ss  for 2/10  s ; 
1/1/ 21   ss  for 12/1  s . 
By going through the analysis as in the previous section, one can show that eq. (30), 
which determines the terms of trade as a function of the relative country size; eqs. (35) and (36), 
which show how firm distributions are related to the market size distributions; and eq. (37), the 
expression for the net trade balances in each sector are not affected.  The expressions for the 
standard-of-living,  kk xuU   , as well as the definition of kx  given in eq. (32), are also 
unaffected, except that the increasing function, )(u , defined in (26), is now simplified to: 
(26’)   1
1
)(  xxu . 
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What changes significantly is the expressions of the market size distributions, eqs.(33) 
and (34) .  They now become, 
(33’)   






 


1
k
s
k
sm , 
and 
(34’)  



















1
2
1
2
1
s
s
s
s
m
m
, 
which is strictly decreasing in s.  This means that Figures 1, 2, and 3 remain valid in this case as 
well.   In particular, there is a unique cutoff sector, sc, such that country 1 is the net exporter in 
the sectors below the cutoff, while country 2 is the net exporter in the sectors above it, as shown 
in Figure 2.    
Unlike (34), however, eq. (34’) shows that the cross-country differences in the demand 
composition in this model depend entirely on the exogenous preference parameters.  In particular, 
it is independent of kx , and hence independent of  ρ, ω, 
kh , kN , and kL .  Thus, the cutoff sector, 
sc, is also independent of these factors.  Thus, neither a uniform productivity improvement nor 
globalization can shift the sectoral patterns of trade.  In other words, the comparative static 
results shown in Figure 4 are entirely due to the nonhomotheticity of preferences.   Also from 
(26’), the welfare gap between the two countries has much simpler expression,  
1
1
2
1
2
1 














x
x
U
U
, 
which means that the parameter changes that keep 21 /  xx  unaffected, such as a uniform 
productivity change or globalization when the two countries are of equal size, do not affect the 
welfare gap.   The possibility of globalization causing a leapfrogging when the smaller country 
has higher per capita labor endowment, illustrated in Figure 5, remains valid, even when the 
cross-country differences in the demand composition is exogenous.   However, the result that 
such a leapfrogging also causes a reversal of the patterns of trade is entirely due to the 
nonhomotheticity of preferences, and cannot happen when the differences are due to the 
exogenous variations in taste. 
©Kiminori Matsuyama, HME and Trade Between Rich & Poor 
31 
 
 
4.   Adding An Outside Goods Sector 
Up to this point, we have followed Krugman (1980) to consider the case where all the 
goods are differentiated goods with iceberg trade costs, produced in Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competitive sectors.  In another well-known model of the home market effect, Helpman and 
Krugman (1985, Ch.10), there are two sectors, only one of which is a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competitive sector.  The other sector is competitive and produces the homogeneous good that can 
be traded at zero cost, which pins down the terms of trade between the two countries.  In this 
setup, they have shown a different form of the home market effect, i.e., the larger country 
becomes a net-exporter of the differentiated goods sector and a net-importer of the homogeneous 
good.   
In this section, we add an outside goods sector into our framework.  In doing so, our 
framework becomes an extension of the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model, where their 
unique differentiated goods sector is divided into a continuum of differentiated goods sectors 
with differential income elasticities.  This also brings our framework closer to the Fajgelbaum-
Grossman-Helpman model, which also pins down the terms of trade by the numeraire sector. 
More specifically, we modify our framework of section 2 as follows.  First, in addition to 
a continuum of monopolistic competitive sectors, there is an outside goods sector, which 
competitively produces the homogeneous good with constant returns to scale technology that 
converts one unit of labor into one unit of output.  Furthermore, this good can be traded at zero 
cost, and hence sold at the same price in both countries.  This allows us to choose the 
homogeneous good as the numeraire.  Then, the household budget constraint is now written as, 
instead of (1), 
(1’) kkkks
k
s
k
o hwEdsdcpC
s



  
1
0
)()(~  ,  
where kOC
~
 denotes the numeraire consumption of household-k.  Second, the preferences of each 
household now have a three-tier structure.  The lower-tier aggregates all differentiated goods 
within each sector with a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, ksC
~
, given in (2).   The middle-tier aggregates 
a continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators with  ]1,0[,~~  sCUU ksk , implicitly additively 
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separable CES, given by (3).   Then, the upper-tier defines the preferences over kOC
~
 and 
 ]1,0[,~~  sCUU ksk  by 
 kW~ = )~log(
~log)1( kkO UC   , with )1,0( .   
The structure is kept otherwise unchanged. 
For a sufficiently small   > 0, the numeraire sectors in both countries employ some 
labor, 0
1
0
  dsVL jsj .  This pins down the wage rates of both countries at 1jw .   This fixes 
the (factor) terms of trade at 1 , independently of ρ.  Furthermore, each household earns kh  
and spends kk hE   on differentiated goods.  The equilibrium conditions are otherwise 
unaffected.   The equilibrium can be solved by following the steps analogous to those in section 
2.   
Under autarky, the household in each country achieves kW0  = ))1log(()1(
kh   + 
 kU0log , where 
(25’) )( 00
kk xuU  ,   with     kkkkk LhNhx 10    . 
Here )(u  is again defined by (26).  However, notice that the definition of kx0  is now modified to 
  kkk Nhx 0 , from   kkk Nhx 0 ,  because each household spends only the fraction of their 
income,  kh , on differentiated goods.  With this new definition of kx0 , the distributions of the 
firms and market sizes across sectors have the same expressions with (27): 
  
 
  
   
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

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


 1
0
1
))((
0
1
))((
0
1
0
1
))((
0
)(
)()(
dtxu
xu
x
xumf
tk
t
sk
s
k
sk
sk
s
k
s












 . 
Under trade equilibrium,  kkk UhW   log))1log(()1(  , and   
)( kk xuU   , with   kkkk xNhx 0)1()1(    , 
where the definition of kx  reflects the fact that the terms of trade are now pinned down at 1 .  
With this new definition of kx , the market size distributions and their ratio have the same 
expressions with (33) and (34): 
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Note that 21 / ss mm  is again strictly decreasing in s if and only if  21  xx   , which is now 
equivalent to  20
1
0 xx        12121 // hhLL  because 1 .  
Some labor are now employed in the numeraire sector, so that the labor market clearing 
condition is no longer given by jjs LdsV 
1
0
, and hence the share of sector-s in the firm 
distribution is no longer equal to jjs LV / .   Instead, by solving the free entry condition in each 
sector and in each country under the condition, jsV > 0, we obtain the measure of firms (and 
varieties produced) as follows: 





1
)( 22111 LmLmV sss  > 0;  




1
)( 22222 LmLmV sss  > 0, 
which requires  /1/ 2211  LmLm ss .  From these expressions and 1
1
0
 dsmks , we obtain, 
 1
211
0
1
1
)( LLLdsVs 

 

;    2
121
0
2
1
)( LLLdsVs 

 

 
from which the condition for   > 0 that ensures a positive employment in the numeraire sector 
in each country is given by )/(),/()1( 122211 LLLLLLMin   .  Using the above 
expressions, the firm distributions are 
21
2211
1
0
1
1
1
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dtV
Vf ss
t
s
s 



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
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
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
 > 0, 
so that  
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which is strictly increasing in 21 / ss mm  and satisfies 1//
2121  ssss mmff , 1//
2121  ssss mmff , 
or 1// 2121  ssss mmff . 
The net trade balances in each sector,     1212112121 )()( wbVwbVNXNX ssssss , can 
now be rewritten as: 
)(
1
)(
1
22112121 LmLmVVNXNX ssssss 







 
Notice that its sign is no longer the same with the sign of 21 ss mm  .  Instead, it is the same with  
the sign of 2211 LmLm ss  .  Thus, whether the country becomes a net-exporter or a net-importer is 
determined by the cross-country difference in the absolute market size in each sector, not the 
cross-country difference in the market size distributions, as was the case in section 2.  This is 
because the active numeraire sectors in both countries, which pins down their wage rates and the 
terms of trade between the two, effectively turns this model into a partial equilibrium model.   
Furthermore, the trade account across all the differentiated goods sectors is given by: 
)(
1
21
1
0
2
1
0
1 LLdsNXdsNX ss 
  

. 
Thus, instead of having a higher factor price, the larger country runs an overall surplus in the 
differentiated goods sectors, with a deficit in the numeraire good sector, which effectively 
reproduces the main result of the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model, which has one 
differentiated goods sector.  
 Figure 6 illustrates the patterns of trade for the case of 21  xx   , which is now equivalent 
to 20
1
0 xx   or  to    12121 // hhLL  due to 1 .   For this case, 21 / ss mm  is strictly decreasing in 
s.   If 1L  and 2L  are not too different, there is a unique cutoff sector, sc )1,0(  such that  
)(
1
221121 LmLmLNXNX ssss 



 > 0  for  s < sc; 
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 )(
1
221121 LmLmLNXNX ssss 



 < 0  for s > sc. 
However, if 1L  and 2L  are too different, the larger country, not necessarily the richer one, runs a 
surplus in all the differential sectors, with a deficit in the numeraire sector. 
 Assuming that the unique cutoff sector sc exists in the interior, the effects of a uniform 
productivity improvement are identical with those shown in section 2.  Furthermore, without 
causing the terms of trade change, the effects of globalization are isomorphic to those of uniform 
productivity improvement, as can be seen from   kkk Nhx   )1(  .   As productivity 
improves or trade costs fall, the world becomes richer.  In response, the households in both 
countries shift their spending towards the higher-indexed in the sense that the density functions 
of the market size distributions before and after satisfy the MLR property and their cumulative 
distribution functions satisfy the FSD.   Furthermore, one can show, following the same steps in 
Section 2.5,   
)log(
)/log(
sgn
21
h
UU

   = 
)1log(
)/log(
sgn
21



 UU
 = )1sgn(  )sgn( 21  xx  , 
and  



)log(
)/log(sgn
21
h
mm ss  
)1log(
)/log(sgn
21

 ss mm = )sgn( 12  xx  . 
Thus, these results cause the welfare gap between the rich and the poor to widen (narrow) if 
different sectors produce substitutes (complements).  With these changes, the cutoff sector 
moves up, as shown in Figure 6, causing something akin to product cycles without any 
technology diffusions from the rich to the poor.  
To summarize the results in this section, the effects of uniform productivity improvement 
are identical with those in section 2.  Unlike in section 2, globalization cannot change the terms 
of trade even when the country sizes are different, because it is pinned down by the numeraire 
sector.  Without the terms-of-trade change, the effects of globalization are isomorphic to those of 
uniform productivity improvements and as well as to those of globalization obtained for the case 
of the two equal size countries in section 2.  However, without the terms of trade change, 
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leapfrogging and a reversal of patterns of trade are no longer possible even if the two countries 
are unequal in size. 
 
5.    Concluding Remarks 
Empirically, rich countries tend to export high income elastic goods and import low 
income elastic goods, while poor countries tend to export low income elastic goods and import 
high income elastic goods.   Virtually all existing models of trade with nonhomothetic 
preferences assume that the rich (poor) countries happen to have comparative advantages in high 
(low) income elastic goods.  With their sources of comparative advantage being unrelated to 
their demand compositions, these models suggest that rich countries export high income elastic 
goods despite they demand relatively more high income elastic goods.  This paper offered our 
attempt to explain why the rich (poor) countries have comparative advantages in high (low) 
income elastic goods by building a theoretical framework, which incorporates nonhomothetic 
preferences into the standard general equilibrium models of trade with the home market effect.  
Under nonhomothetic preferences, the demand compositions in richer countries are more skewed 
towards the goods with higher income elasticity than those in poorer countries.  In the presence 
of economies of scale in production and positive but non-prohibitive trade costs, such cross-
country differences in the demand composition become sources of comparative advantage 
through the home market effect.   In other words, rich countries export high income elastic goods 
because they demand relatively more high income elastic goods.  
Although the intuition is simple, an attempt to capture it in a theoretical framework that is 
flexible enough to allow for a variety of comparative static exercises has been a challenge, 
because general equilibrium models with imperfect competition, economies of scale, positive 
trade costs, an arbitrary number of sectors, and nonhomothetic preferences could become quickly 
intractable.  We have managed to keep it tractable by using nonhomothetic preferences that are 
implicitly additive separable CES, which implies that the weighs attached to different sectors in 
preferences satisfy log-supermodularity, which facilitate monotone comparative statics.  It seems 
that this form of nonhomothetic preferences should find a wide range of applications. 
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Appendix:  Two Lemmas 
This appendix offers two lemmas, which are used repeatedly in the analysis.  
 
Lemma 1:  For a positive value function, );(ˆ xg  : [0,1]  R+,  with a parameter x, define a 
density function on [0,1] by 
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18The results in this lemma are not new.  For example, they were used in Matsuyama (2013, 2014) without proof.  
Furthermore, ii) follows immediately from i). Indeed, they are special cases of more general properties of log-
supermodularity known in the literature: see, e.g., Athey (2002) and Vives (1999; Ch.2.7).  Nevertheless, we offer 
here a simpler and more direct (although less elegant) proof without the machinery of lattice theory under the 
differentiability assumption for the sake of the completeness. 
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First, with 
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Figure 1:  (Factoral) Terms of Trade Determination: 21 / LL  =  ;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Home Market Effect and Patterns of Trade: for  11  xuU   <  22  xuU   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ρ)1/σ 
1 
L1/L2 
O 
1 
(ρ)‒1/σ 
ω ≡ w1/w2 
2’s Net Exports 
 ρ(ω)‒σ 
ρ‒1(ω)‒σ 
sc 1 
1’s Net Exports 
O 
1 
ms1/ ms2 
 
fs1/ fs2 
 
s 
©Kiminori Matsuyama, HME and Trade Between Rich & Poor 
42 
 
Figure 3; Ranking the Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  The Effect of An Uniform Productivity Improvement and Globalization (when the two 
countries are in equal size) 
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Figure 5: Possibility of Leapfrogging and Reversal of Patterns of Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Home Market Effect and Patterns of Trade with An Outside Sector 
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